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(35 C.1d 653; 221 P.2d '13) 
[L. A. No. 20686. In Bank. Aug. 4, 1950.] 
JACK STANLEY, Respondent, v. COLUMBIA BROAD-
CASTING SYSTEM, INC. (a Corporation), Appellant. 
[1] Literary Property-Remedies-Recovery on Implied.Contract. 
-The originator of an idea may recover on an implied con-
tract from one who uses or infringes it where the idea was 
novel and reduced te, concrete form prior to its appropriation 
by defendant, and where disclosure of the idea by the origi-
nator to the appropriator took place under circumstances 
indirating that compensation was expected if the idea was 
used. 
[2] Id.-8imilarity or Identity of Compositions.-The problem of 
similarity between two compositions, whether literary, musi-
calor dramatic, is a question of fact to be determined ulti-
mately by a comparison of the two works on the basis of the 
opinion of the average individual possessing a praetieal un-
derstuuJlIIg of the subject. 
[3] Id.-Common Law Rights and Statutory CopJrights.-Com-
lUon law rights in literary property are generally limited to 
unpublished works and are of a wider and more exclusive 
nature than the rights conferred by statutory copyrights in 
published works. The common law prohibits any kind of 
unauthorized interference with or use of an unpublished 
work, while a statutory copyright permits a fair use of the 
copyright publication without deeming it an infringement. 
[4] Id.-Infringement-Tests.-The test in determining whether 
there has been an infringement of a literary work is the 
impression received by the average reasonable man OD a com-
parative reading of that work and the alleged infringing work, 
and not by a dissection of sentences and incidents. 
[6] Id. - Infringement - Copying. - In determining whether the 
similarity which exists between a copyrighted literary, dra-
matic or musical work and an alleged infringing pUblication 
is due to copying, the common knowledge of the average 
reader, observer, spectator or listener is the standard of 
judgment which must be used. 
[Sa, 6b] Id. - Remedies - Evidence.-ln an aetion by a writer 
against a broadcasting company to retover OD an implied agree-
ment. of th .. company to pay the writer for a radio progr~ 
[1] Sec 16 Cal.Jur. 665; 3.,l Am.Jur. 472. 
McK. Dig. References: [1-11] Literary Property; (12] Damages, 
§ 188 j [13) New Trial, § 71 (5). 
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allegedly originated by him, sufficient similarity between the 
writer's proposed program and that given by the eompany 
was shown to justify an implied finding of the jury that the 
company appropriated the program idea, where both programs 
were entitled "Hollywood Preview," and both, with slight 
variations, sought public approval in the selection of stories 
and stars for motion picture production, .with emphasis on 
audience participation or o1Ier of prizes. 
[7] ld.-Remedies-Evidence.-In an action by a writer against 
a broadcasting company to recover on an implied agreement 
of the company to pay the writer for a radio program alleg-
edly originated by him, the evidence was sufficient to show 
that the company had access to the writer's program idea 
where it appeared that he submitted his program to several 
officials and employees of the company at di1Ierent times prior 
to its use by the company. 
[8] ld.-Subject Matter-Originality.-Although there is nothing 
new in a play broadcast over the air, nor in the use of the 
words "Hollywood Preview" in connection with the first show-
ing to the public of a motion picture, nor in audience par-
ticipation in the broadcast, the cOlllbination of all of these 
elements to make one idea for a radio program is new and 
novel so as to be entitled to protection against its unauthor-
ized use by a person other than the originator. 
[S] ld.-Subject Matter-Orlginality.-An author who takes ex-
isting materials from sources C01lllIlon to all writers, arranges 
and combines them in a new form, giving them an applica-
tion unknown before, is entitled to a copyright, notwithstand-
ing the fact that he may have borrowed much of his materials 
and ideas from others, provided they are assembled in a 
different manner and combined for a di1Ierent purpose, and 
his plan and arrangement are a real improvement on existing 
modes. 
[10] ld.-Subject Matter-Originality.-The question of original-
ity of a radio program alleged to have been infringed is not 
one of law to be determined by the court, but is one of fact 
for the jury's determination where there is a conflict of evi-
dence as to whether this program is similar to that of an 
alleged infringing program. 
[11] ld.-Publication.-The making of an audition recording of 
a writer's proposed radio program before an audience in a 
broadcasting company's studio is not making his idaa "public 
property" within the menning of the law, but amounts to a 
limited or restricted pUblication as distinguished from a gen-
eral publication. 
[12] Damages-Evidence.-In an action by a writer against a 
broadcasting company to recover on an implied agreement of 
) 
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the company to pay the writer for a radio program allegedly 
originated by him, an award of $35,000 was supported by 
evidence that he had spent several years in the preparation 
of his idea for a radio program, that he had a recording n:ade 
of it when an audition was held which entailed the employ-
ment of various actors and technicians, and that the idea was 
of no value after its use by the company, and where both the 
writer and his expert witness testified as to the estimated 
worth of the program idea, and as to the custom in the indus-
try to pay the author a certain percentage of production costs 
based on the number of weeks a show was on the air. 
[IS] New Trial-Newly Discovered Evidence-Discretion of 'i'rial 
Oourt.-In an action by a writer against a broadcasting com-
pany to recover on an implied agreement of the company to 
pay the writer for a radio program allegedly originated· by 
him, it was not an abuse of discretion to deny the company's 
motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered 
evidence that the idea for the radio program had originated 
with a third person, where the idea as presented by such per-
son contained no element of audience participation or offer 
of prizes as was contained in the radio program that was 
used, and where affidavits filed in opposition to the motion 
presented the same conflict as the evidence adduced at the 
trial. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Roy V. Rhodes, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action by writer against broadcasting compaJiy to recover' 
on an implied agreement of company to pay writer for a 
radio program allegedly originated by him. Judgment for 
plaintiff affirmed. 
O'Melveny & Myers, Homer I. Mitchell, W. B. Carman, Jr .. 
Louis W. Myers and Deane F. Johnson for Appellant. 
Loeb & Loeb and Herman F. Selvin, Amici Curiae on behalf 
of Appellant. . 
Harold A. Fendler and John W. Preston for Respondent. 
CARTER. .J .-Defendnnt bas appealt'd from a verdict and 
judgment for $35.000 given by a jury in favor of the plaintiff. 
The action was brought to recow'r on an alIt'ged implied agree-
mt'nt of defendant to pay plaintiff for a radio program which 
plaintiff claims to have originated. 
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In his complaint, plaintiff alleged that during the year 
1941 he originated and caused to be prepared, composed and 
written an original script for a radio program entitled 
"Walter Wanger Presents" and a radio program format 
entitled "Preview Parade" or "Hollywood Preview" amI 
that about September 1st of that year he had this script re-
corded for the purpose of submitting it to prospective spon-
sors, advertising agencies and broadcasting companies. He 
alleged that he, at all times, retained full ownership of the 
radio program and that he at no time licensed or authorized 
the use of it in any manner. Plaintiff further alleged that 
during the years 1942, 1943 and 1944 he submitted to the 
defendant, Columbia Broadcasting System, Incorporated, the 
radio program, script, format and records for the purpose of 
having the defendant determine whether or not it desired to 
purchase it or license the right to use it under an implied 
agreement that if the defendant did use the radio program 
it would pay plaintiff its reasonable value. But that on or 
about the . first of May, 1945, the defendant produced and 
presented a radio program entitled "Hollywood Preview" 
which substantially copied and embodied plaintiff's radio 
program and, as a result, became indebted to the plaintiff for 
the use thereof. 
On this appeal, defendant contends that the court should 
have found, as a matter of law, that there was no similarity 
between the two programs; that the evidence was insufficient to 
show that defendant had access to plaintiff's program idea; 
that there can be no implied agreement to pay for an abstract 
idea which is not new or novel; that the jury arbitrarily 
ignored the uncontradicted, unimpeached testimony of defend-
ant's witness, Hudson; that when an idea is made public there 
can be no liability for its use; that its motion for a new trial 
on the grounds that (1) the jury's verdict for damages was so 
excessive that it appeared to have been given under the in-
fluence of prejudice and passion, (2) newly discovered evi-
dence; and (3) that the evidence was insufficient to support 
the verdict should have been granted. 
[1] As a general observation from the cases, it may be 
stated that the right of the originator of an idea to recover 
from one who uses or infringes it seems to depend upon 
whether or not the idea was novel and rednced to concrete form 
prior to its appropriation by the defendant, and, where the 
idea was disclosed by the originator to the appropriator, 
whether such disclosure took place under circumstances indi-
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cating that compensation was expected if the idea was used. 
Where these prerequi.sites exist, recovery may be had upon 
a theory of contract implied in fact or in law. (Plus Promo-
tions v. R.C.A. Mfg. Co., (N.Y.) 49 F.Supp. 116; Alberts v. 
Remington Rand, 175 Misc. 486 [23 N.Y.S.2d 892] ; Healey v. 
R. H. Macy & Co., 251 App.Div. 440 [297 N.Y.S. 165], aff'd. 
277 N.Y. 681 [14 N.E.2d 388).) 
Plaintiff's complete program is as follows: 
"Announcer: 'Ladies and gentlemen, WALTER WANGER 
PRESENTS Hollywood Preview! Hol1ywood Preview! Holly-
wood Preview I 
" 'And here is Hollywood's distinguished producer, Walter 
Wanger.' 
"Wanger: 'How do you do, ladies and gentlemen. Welcome 
to our Hollywood Pre,iew Parade, a radio show designed for 
your pleasure and to give you a voice in what pictures Holly-
wood shall produce in the months to come. Hollywood is 
very interested in giving you motion pictures you want to 
see. Unfortunately produeers do not and cannot always know 
just what you do want. This is the reason for this "Pre'\"iew 
Parade. " Eaeh week we plan to present a radio story we 
think will make a good film. We ask you to send us your 
opinion and suggest players for the leading roles. Our sponsor 
will give worthwhile cash prizes for the best letters, but 
more about that later. 
" 'Now allow me to introduce Mr. True Boardman.' 
"Boardman: 'This is the sixth program of the new series, 
"Walter Wanger Presents." Your host is one of Hollywood's 
most progressive film leaders, the President of the Academy 
of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences, and producer of such 
outstanding films as Foreign Correspondent, Blockade, Long 
Voyage Home, Stagecoach, Algiers, and currently Sundown. 
" 'Eaeh week Mr. Wanger selects a story which he feels 
should be made into a picture. You are asked to write to 
Mr. Wanger and give him your opinion. The sponsors pay 
$500 for the best letter written by one of our listeners and if 
enough of you vote for it our play will be produced as a motion 
picture. 
" 'And now, once again, Walter Wanger.' 
"Wanger: 'Thank you, Mr. Boardman. Tonight our play 
is entitled "So Gallantly Gleaming." It has been written.by 
Harvey Thew, Peter Ordway, and Sonya Levien. The radio 
adaptation is by Hector Chevigny. 
) 
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" , "So Gallantly Gleaming" tells a thrilling and romantic 
story of a great explorer, his beautiful wife, and the acquisi-
tion of California. Listen closely. Do you think it should be 
made into a motion picture T Your votes will decide. 
" 'Our guests who will later give their opinion are Miss 
Joan Bennett, Hector Chevigny and Henry Hathaway. Music 
is by Robert Armbruster.' " 
DRAMA 
"Boardman: 'Thank you, ladies and gentlemen. Did you 
like" So Gallantly Gleaming'" Would you like to see it as a 
motion picture' The story of John Charles Fremont, I think, 
is one that deserves retelling. In a moment we will hear the 
opinion of our three Hollywood guests, Joan Bennett, Hector 
Chevigny, and Henry Hathaway. and then have an oppor-
tunity to compare their opinions with yours. 
" 'Now again a word as to the real idea behind this pro-
gram. Each week Walter Wanger Presents brings you a 
story which we think would be a good motion picture. And 
here is your part in the program. We ask you to write to 
Mr. Wanger, telling him whether or not you would like to 
have this play madp into a motion picture, and why. Also 
include your choice of stars to play the leading roles. The 
best letter received each week will receive an award of $500 
from our sponsor. The award is based not on the style of your 
letter, not on brilliant writing. but entirely on the reasons you 
set down as your opinion. And believe me, Hollywood is 
waiting for your vote. Whether or not yon win a prize. your 
vote will help decide whether or not to film "So Gallantly 
Gleaming." The American picture-going public has long said 
it wished a voice in the choice of stories presented on the 
screen. Here is the chance for you to have that voice and 
make it heard across the nation. Write your letter now 
tonight. Address Walter Wanger, Hollywood, California. 
"'Last week Mr. Wanger pre~pnted "Out of the Night," 
the sensational novel which has attracted such nationwide 
comment. A storm of argument was aroused. Sixty-ei!!ht 
thousand letters have been received to date. and we are 
happy to announce that Warner Brothers Studio have 
arranged to make this startling f;tory into a film in the near 
future. So, thanks to yonr Iptters. you have helped' Warner 
Brother~ to their ilecision to film "Ollt of the Night." 
" 'Last week's best letter was from Mrs. William Wentworth 
) 
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of Brockton, Massachusetts. Congratulations, Mrs. Wentworth I 
Your check for $500 goes forward immediately. 
" 'Now, Mr. Wanger, I think we are all anxious to hear the 
opinions of your guests about tonight's show.' 
(Interview with Board of Experts) 
"Wanger: 'Thank you. Thank you very much. Thank 
you, Joan Bennett, Henry Hathaway, Hector Chevigny. Do 
you ladies and gentlemen, agree with the opinions of our 
guestsf Do you agree that "So Gallantly Gleaming" should 
become a motion picture t And who do you think should play 
the leading roles f Won't you write and tell us. Remember 
that whether your letter is best and wins the prize or not, you 
are helping Hollywood decide on what to give you on the 
screen. Next week we will have something totally different for 
you, a story called •• Two Arabian Knights." Until then, this 
is Walter Wanger saying, Good night.' 
" Announcer: • Walter Wanger Presents is brought to you at 
this same time each week by our sponsor. Original music for 
tonight's show was written and directed, as always, by Robert 
Armbruster. The cast included Hollywood's outstanding radio 
stars-Lurene Tuttle, Lou Crosby, Norman Field, Elliott 
Lewis, Lou Merrill, Frederick Shields, Paul Whitley, Norene 
Gamille, Gayne Whitman. 
" 'This is John Hiestand hanging out the "Goodnight" 
sign until we meet again next week at this same time. This is 
the National Broadcasting Company.' " 
The following is a portion of the broadcast preceding and 
following the drama as actually put on the air by defendant: 
" Announcer: 'It's The Flying Red Horse . . . the sign that 
identifies the Mobilgas and MobiZoil dealers who bring you 
... "HOLLYWOOD PREVlEW"· ... with Mr. Otto Kruger!' 
" Announcer: 'Tonight, on behalf of your Mobilgas and 
Mobiloil dealer ... Mr. Otto Kruger, eminent star of radio, 
stage and screen brings you another Hollywood Preview of a 
motion picture of the future! Tonight's story . . • "Growing 
Pains" . . . a comedy by Aurania Rouveral now scheduled 
for production by RKO Pictures. 
" 'And as our star . . . Miss Marcy Maguire I 
" 'Now ... ladies and gentlemen ... Otto Kruger!' 
"Kruger: 'Thank you. Good evening, everyone. Well, it's 
another Preview Night here in Hollywood, and Mobilgas in-
vites you to share in the excitement. For just as the first 
showing of a new motion picture in the film capitol means 
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bright lights and eager crowds, 80 does the same spirit of 
enthusiasm prevail on our radio version of Hollywood Preview. 
So, tonight, it's "Growing Pains" . . . famous as a play 
... and no,v being prepared for filming at RKO. And as our 
star ... well, because "Growing Pains" is a story about 
irresistible youth, we wanted Hollywood's most enthusiastic, 
effervescent young lady in the leading role of Terry. And we 
found exactly that in the person of red-headed . . . Marcy 
Maguire.' 
"Announcer: 'And now, "Growing Pains" •. .' 
" Announcer: 'So ends tonight's Hollywood Preview 
Story.' " 
(Interview with star follows.) 
"Announcer: 'Now, as our theatre audience fills out cards 
giving their comments and indicating their favorites for the 
picture version of "Growing Pains," a special word of greet-
ing to some new listeners.'" (Advertising for sponsor fol-
lows; announcements as to producer, director and music.) 
[2] The problem of similarity between two compositions, 
whether literary, musical or dramatic, is a question of fact 
to be determined ultimately by a comparison of the two works 
upon the basis of the opinion of the average individual pos-
sessing a practical understanding of the subject. Although 
the majority of the decided cases involved a questioned in-
fringement of a copyrighted work, it would seem that the test 
of whether or not an infringement existed would be the same 
as the question here involved-the determination of whether 
or not such similarity exists between plaintiff's and defend-
ant's programs as to suggest to the average person the use 
by defendant of an idea originating with plaintiff upon proof 
of the other elements necessary to enable the plaintiff to re-
cover. The analogy between the hvo is drawn by the court 
in De Acosta v. Brown, 146 Fed.2d 408. 
The parties have conceded that the applicable sections of 
the Civil Code, 980' and 9832 as they read at the time plain. 
'''Seetion 980. The author of any product of the mind, whether it is 
an invention, or n eomposition in letters or art, or a design, with or 
without delineation, or other graphical represent.ation, has an exclusive 
ownership therein. and in the representation or expression thereof, which 
continues so long as the produet and the representations or expressions 
thereof made by him remain in his possession." 
I" Section 983. If the owner of n product of the mind intentionally 
makes it public, a eopy or reproduction Dlay he mad!' puhlic by any 
person, without responsibilit1 to the owner, so far as the law of this 
atate it concerned." 
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tiff's cause of action arose, are but codifications of the com-
mon law. [3] The common law right in literary property 
and the right existing under the copyright law are contrasted 
as follows: .. The term' copyright' is sometimes wsed to desig-
nate the property in intellectual productions conferred by the 
common law as well as that conferred by statute, the full 
pbrase . common-law copyright' being sometimes used. The 
justification for this use of the term at tbe present day is 
found only in the fact that the common law confers on the 
owner of an intellectual production the exclusive right to make 
first publication of it, that is, tbe rigbt to copy it in tbe first 
instance . Whether the commOn law ever conferred a 
copyright in the sense of an exclusive right of continued 
pUblication and sale bas been a matter of doubt and 
dispute, . . . but however this may be, the range of rights 
and liabilities existing at common law with respect to 
intellectual productions is essC'J1tially and greatly different 
from those existing under the copyright statutes. Bobbs-
Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 [28 S.Ct 722, 52 L.Ed 
1086]. Speaking gem·rally. common-law rights are limited to 
unpublished works, and all common-law property rights 
therein are lost on a publication while statutory copy-
rights relate mainly to published works.. . Again, common 
law rights ill ullpublished works are of a wider and more 
exclusive nature than the rights conferred by statutory copy-
right in published works. The common law prohibits any 
kind of unauthorized interference with, or use of, an unpub-
ished work on the ground of an exclusive property right, and 
the common-law right is perpetual, existing until lost or 
terminated by the voluntary act of the owner, ... while a 
statutory copyright permits a • fair use' of the copyright pub-
lication, without deeming it an infringement .... " [Empha-
sis added.] (18 C.J .S., Copyright and Literary Property, 
§ 2, p. 138 et seq.; and cases there cited.) 
[4] The test. with respect to infringement, which is laid 
down by the C8ses is that impression received by the average 
reasonable man upon a comparative reading of the two works 
"not by a dissection of sentences and incidents, suitable for 
the study of a digest or textbook, but inherently unnatural 
for any man who has the kind of brains that make him able 
to adapt a work of firtion." (Fra'tlkel v. Irwin, 34 F.2d 142, 
144.) (lfhite-Smith Music Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 17 
[28 S.Ct. 319, 52 L.Ed. 655) ; 13 C.J. 1113, § 276, n. 30; Harold 
) 
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Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer, 65 F.2d 1, 18; Hewitt v. Coward, 41 
N.Y.S.2d 498; Dymow v. Bolton, 11 F.2d 690; Twentieth. 
Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Dieckhaus, 153 F.2d 893 i 15 
Cornell L.Q. 633, 639.) 
[5] In determining whether the similarity which exists 
between a copyrighted literary, dramatic or musical work. 
aud an alleged infringing .. publication is due to copying, the 
common knowledge of the average reader, observer, spectator 
or listener is the standard of judgment which must be 
used. (Echevarria v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 12 F.Supp. 632; 
Sieff v. Continental Auto Supply, 39 F.Supp. 683; Barbadillo 
v. Goldwyn, 42 F.2d 881,885.) 
[6a] With respect to the comparison between the two 
programs and without unnecessarily "dissecting" them, there 
appears to be sufficient similarit;\- to justify the finding of 
the jury as the "average, reaSOllll ble man." There are, it is 
true, certain dissimilarities which appear: The lack of the 
so-called Board of Experts on defendant's program i the fact 
that the studio audience only was requested to respond i and 
the rather less emphasis which is placed on the reaction of 
the public to the play it has heard. The element of prizes 
offered for the best letter \vas incorporated into defendant's 
program after it had made its first few appearances on the 
air and was continued for a period of six weeks. Each case 
must be determined on its own facts. (Frankel v. Irwin, 
supra.) "It is of course essential to any protection of literary 
property, whether at common-law or under the statute, that 
the right cannot be limited literally to the text, else a 
plagiarist would escape by immaterial variations. That has 
never been the Jaw, but, as soon as literal appropriation 
ceases to be the test, the whole matter is necessarily at large, 
so that, as was recently well said by a distinguished judge, 
the decisions cannot help much in a new case. Fendler v. 
Morosco, 253 N.Y. 281, 292, 171 N.E. 56." (Nichols v. Uni-
versal Pictures Corp_, 45 F.2d 119, 121.) "Evidence of these 
differences is relevant upon the question of infringement, but ,. 
if such differences are shown to exist, the question remains 
for the trier of fact to decide the issue." (Universal Pictures 
Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp_, 162 F.2d 354, 361.) (Pellegri-ni v. 
Allegrini, D.C., 2 F.2d 610_) "Slight differences and variations 
will not serve as a defense." (Universal Pictures Co. v. Harold 
Lloyd Corp., supra, 361.) (Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. Ralph 
A. Freundlich, Inc., 73 F.2d 276, 278; Nutf v. National Insti-
tvte Inc. for Imp. of Memory, 31 F.2d 236, 238.) 
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We then have a question of fact-that of the similarity 
between the two programs. This question of fact was decided 
adversely to defendant by the jury whose duty it was to make 
the determination. The rule is settled that this determination 
will not be interfered with upon appeal where there is 
evidence to sustain it. The evidence, in the form of the two 
programs alone, shows that there is substantial similarity to 
support the verdict. 
Because of the factual dissimilarity between this case and 
Golding v. R.E.O. Pictures, Inc., L. A. No. 20699, post, p. 690 
[221 P.2d 95], this day decided, the scope of the inquiry 
upon the issue of similarity is necessarily different. In each 
case the issue of similarity was properly submitted to the 
jury. Similarity having been found by the jury, we look to 
the evidence to ascertain whether such similarity existed as 
to the portion of the production which plaintiff claims to have 
originated. In this case it is the entire plan, the grouping 
together or arrangement of various elements which constitutes 
the claimed infringement. In the Golding case it is only the 
plot or basic dramatic core of the play which is claimed to be 
original and to have been unlawfully copied by the defendant. 
It follows that the inquiry in the Golding case is a more limited 
one than that in the present case because of the nature of the 
claimed infringement. 
[7] The next contention made by the defendant is that the 
defendant had no access to plaintiff's program idea. There 
is evidence in the record to show that plaintiff submitted his 
program to several officials and employees of the broadcasting 
company at different times during the years 1942, 1943 and 
1944. Implicit in this submission was the belief that if the 
program were used he would be compensated therefor. It was 
admitted by defendant's witness Hudson at the trial that it 
was the custom in the radio industry to pay for such ideas 
when and if they were used. 
It is conceded by the defendant in its brief that plaintiff's 
idea had been reduced to the concrete form of a script format 
and recording. [8] The next question to be discussed is 
whether or not plaintiff's idea as such was so new and novel 
as to be worthy of prot;"'ction. It may be conceded at the outset 
that there is nothing new in a play broadcast over the air; it 
may also be conceded that there is nothing new in the use oof 
the words "Hollywood Preview" in connection with the first 
showing to the public of a motion picture; it may also be noted 
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that audience participation, as such, is not new to radio. But 
when all of these elements are joined to make one idea for a 
radio program, it is the combination which is new and now'I. 
[9] An author who takes existing materials from sources 
common to all writers, arranges and combines them in a new 
form, giving them an application unknown before, is entitled 
to a copyright, notwithstanding the fact that he may have 
borrowed much of his materials and ideas from others, pro-
vided they are assembled in a different manner and combined 
for a different purpose, and his plan and arrangement are a 
real improvement upon existing modes; for the labor of 
making these selections, arrangements and combinations has 
entailed the exercise of skill, discretion and creative effort. 
(Edwards d': Deutsch Lithographing Co. v. Boorman, 15 F.2d 
35.) "If the author has accomplished a unique and useful 
result through the application of intellectual labor and literary 
or artistic skill, his work is entitled to a copyright which will 
protect the plan, arrangement and combination of the ma-
terials therein, even though all the materials of such work, 
or some parts of its plan, or the arrangement and modes of 
illustrating the subject matter thereof, may be found sepa-
rately or in a different form or setting, or in a different 
combination in otller distinct works." (Ball, The Law of 
Copyright and Literary Property, p. 247.) (Barsha v. Mctro-
Goldwyn-ltlayer, 32 CaI.App.2d 556 [90 P.2d 371].) It has 
been previously pointed out that an author's right in the 
fruits of his intellectual labor at common law is even broader 
than that which he has under the law of copyright. 
It was admitted by Hudson, defendant's principal witness, 
that prior to the time the program in question was placed on 
the air there was no program in which the listening audience 
in the studio or the listening audience on the radio were 
asked to give their opinions as to the suitability of the 
material broadcast by radio for motion picture products. He 
further admitted that it was a new idea for the listening 
audience, whether studio, or the entire listening public, to 
comment on the prospect.ive stars to appear in the proposed 
productions. The defendant, however, maintains that its 
studio audience participation was merel:' atmosphere and 
was not intended to give the public any rea] participation in 
the choice of future pictures. If this was the true intention of 
defendant, the following exccrpt from the testimony of 
Hudson shows that the studio audience was not so advised nor 
led to believe: 
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"Q. When you first put the program on the air l:itart iug 
on May first your studio audience was asked to submit CUlli-
ment first as to whether they thought the material suitable for 
pictures, and second, the persons they would like to see in 
the leading roles, isn't that right 7 A. That is right." 
Thus the evidence shows that defendant's principal witness, 
a man who had been in the radio business for some years, be-
li('ved that a plan such as plaintiff's was new in the sense that 
the particular combination of ideas had not before been used 
in radio. It is also evident that it was the custom in the 
radio industry to pay for such ideas. [10] Furthermore, 
the question of originality of plaintiff's program is not one of 
law to be determined by the court but is one of fact for the 
jury's determination. (Ya.dkoe v. Fields, 66 Cal.App.2d 150, 
159 [151 P.2d 906]; Dezendorf v. Twentieth Oentury-Fox 
Film Oorp., (C.C.A. 9) 99 F.2d 850, 851; New York Belting 
00. v. New Jersey Rubber 00., 137 U.S. 445, 450 [11 8.0t. 193, 
34 L.Ed. 741].) 
[6b] The next contention made by defendant is that the 
jury arbitrarily ignored the uncontradicted, unimpeached 
testimony of defendant's witness, Hudson. The record shows 
that this witness' testimony was contradicted and impeached 
at different times throughout the trial. His testimony with 
respect to the so-called program evolved by him in 1940 (before 
defendant had access to plaintiff's work) which it is con-
tended is the one broadcast by the defendant company, is 
worthy of mention. He testified that the idea back of his pro-
gram was to promote the sale of stories by authors who could 
not get a hearing from important motion picture executives. 
He admitted that he had not considered having any audience 
participation feature, and, of course, no prize offered for the 
best letters, nor had he considered the title "Hollywood Pre- . 
view." It would seem that the audience participation feature, 
whether the studio audience or the entire listening public, 
was one of the more salient parts of plaintiff's program. The 
members of the listening, movie-going public, may well have 
been sufficiently intrigued with the thought that they were 
having a voice in the selection of «« moving pictures of the 
future" so as to increase the popularity rating of the program. 
There was a great deal of testimony at the trial concerning the 
"Hooper" system of ratings. This is a system used to ascer-
tain the number of listeners tuned in to a particular program. 
It was also shown at the trial that the percentage of listeners 
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increased with respect to this particular program after the 
•• prize for the best letter" feature was added. Using the 
same test here as to the similarity between the program 
actually broadcast and Hudson's program, it would seem that 
defendant's contention is without merit. It would not be 
apparcnt to the" reasonablc man" upon a comparison of the 
two that there was such similarity to raise the inference that 
defendant's program was that originated by Hudson in 
1940. 
[11] Defendant's contention that there can be no liability 
to pay for an idea which has been made public is without merit 
when the facts of this case are considered. When plaintiff 
madc his audition recording before an audience in the National 
Broadcasting Company's studio he was not making his idea 
"public property" within the meaning of the law. Prior to 
publication an author may make copies of his production 
and enjoy the benefit of limited or restricted publication with-
out forfeiture of the right of a general publication. The com-
munication of the contents of a work under restriction, known 
as a "restricted or limited" publication, is illustrated by per-
formances of a dramatic or musical composition before a select 
audience, private circulation of the manuscript, etc. (Ball, 
Literary Property and Copyright, 473; Werckmeister v. 
American Lithog"aphic Co., 134 F. 321, 324 l69 C.C.A. 553, 
68 L.R.A. 591]; Palmer v. De Witt, 47 N.Y. 532, 543 (7 
Am.Rep. 480J; American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 
U.S. 284 [28 8.Ct. 72. 52 L.Ed. 208] ; Nutt v. National Instt-
tute Inc. for Imp. of Memory, supra; Ferris v. Frohman, 223 
U.S. 424 [32 S.Ct. 263, 56 L.Ed. 492] ; Uproar Co. v. National 
Broadcasting Co., 8 F.Supp. 358, aff'd, 81 F.2d 373.) 
[12] With respect to defendant's motion for a new trial 
which was denied by the trial court, various contentions are 
made by defendant as to why it should have been granted. First, 
it is said that the jury's verdict was so excessive that it must 
have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice. 
There is evidence in the record to show that plaintiff spent 
several years in the preparation of his idea for a radio program; 
that he had a recording made of it when the audition was 
held which entailed the employment of various screen and 
radio actors, technicians and the like. There is evidence to 
show that plaintiff's idea was of 110 value whatl'oever to him 
after its use by the defendant. As was said in Yadkoe v. 
Fields. 66 Cal.App.2d 150, 161 [151 P.2d 906]; "Moreover, 
the implied finding that the nature of the material here in-
) 
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volved is such that no value attaches thereto aside from the 
liSt' thereof, aud that once such material is used the value 
therein is gone, is fuBy justified by the evidence .... Under 
the circumstances here presented, appellant's contention as to 
lack of evidence of the value of the use of the material is 
without merit." The above quoted case involved the affirma-
tion by the District Court of Appeal of a jury verdict of 
$8,000 damages given for the use of isolated" gags." In the 
present case, both plaintiff and his expert witness testified as to 
the estimated worth of the program idea, and as to the custom 
in the industry to pay the author a certain percentage of the 
production costs based on the number of weeks a show was 
on the air. "The fact that personal property which is injured 
or destroyed by the wrongful or negligent act of another, has 
no market value, does not restrict the recovery to nominal 
damages only; its value or the plaintiff's damages must be 
ascertained in some other rational way and from such elements 
as are attainable. In such case the proper measure of dam-
ages is generally its actual value or its value to the owner. 
The value of an article ma~' be shown by proof of such 
elements or facts as may exist--such as its cost, the cost of 
reproducing or replacing it, its utility and use .... " (Uni-
versal Pictures Co., v. Harold Lloyd Corp .. 162 F.2d 354, 370, 
quoting from 15 Am.Jur. 554, 555.) It would appear that 
the evidence is sufficient to support the finding of the jury as 
to the amount of damages, and that the verdict was not given 
under the influence of passion and prejudice. 
[13] The newly discovered evidence claimed by defendant 
is shown by the affidavit of one James Allen who states that in 
1935 he conceived the idea of a radio program on which wonld 
appear stories presented in dramatic form to the public as 
a "showcase" of possible literary material for the legitimate 
stage. This idea was registered with" Billboard," a theatrical 
publication in New York City in 1935. In 1939, this idea was 
registered with the Screen Writers' Guild under the possible 
title, "Play Preview." It contained no element of audience 
participation or offer of prizes. The idea back of his program 
was to present the st('ries to "the attention of stage and screen 
producers" and not to the publie ~enerally. Allen's 19a9 
prospectus did not set forth Hny of the details of his idea. 
Plaintiff was working for Allen as musical director at that 
time, and he states that he made several suggestions with 
respect to the program. This is denied by Allen in his 
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affidavit. There are affidavits in the record to the effect that 
plaintiff had discussed his program idea in 1938 with the 
affiants. These affidavits prcsent the same conflict 8S the evi-
dence adduced at the trial. They were before thp court upon 
the motion for a new trial. A motion for a new trial on this 
ground is to a large extent addressed to the discretion of the 
trial judge, and an appellate court will not disturb his ruling-
unless it is manifest tbat a gross or unmistakable abuse of 
discretion appears. (Kirschbaum v. McCarthy, 5 Cal.2d 191 
[54 P.2d 8) ; Cooper v. Kellogg, 2 Cal.2d 504 [42 P.2d 59] ; 
Buckhantz v. R. G. Hamilton Co., 71 Cal.App.2d 777 (l63 
P.2d 756]; JJontaldo v. Hires Bottling Co., 59 Cal.App.2d 
642 [J39 P.2d 6661). It cannot be said that there was such 
an abuse of discretion in the present case. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., and Edmonds, J., concurred. 
SCHAUER, J.-I concur in the judgment of affirmance. 
The problem in this case is to me a closer one and more 
difficult of solution than that presented in Golding v. R.K.O. 
Pictures, Inc., post, p. 690 [221 P.2d 95]. In Golding there 
is no substantial similarity between the two works except pos-
sibly in thf' so-called "central core," which, in this decade, as 
I have shown (post, p. 710), is no more novel or original 
than (on a claim of like date) the Star Spangled Banner. 
But here there is cognizable similarity or deducible relation-
ship between every substantial element of the program which 
defendant produceo and that which was proposed by plaintiff. 
Likewise, the evidence shows ample opportunity for piracy. 
The sole controlling question then is one of fitness for literary 
protectibility of that which was pirated. 
The problem here is more difficult than in Golding because 
here we are in a newer field; all of its vistas have been by 
no means explored. The merc)landise offered for sale in this 
case-and asserted)y appropriated-is of a quite different 
character from that involved in Golding. The craft of story-
plotting, together with the art of story-telling, has come down 
through the centuries. and legislatures and courts long have 
experimented with affording a measure of monopolistic' or 
property-right protectibility to literary compositions of con-
ventional nature even though all plotted stories, it is said, 
must be but an application of one or more of "The Thirty-
Six Dramatic Situations." (Georges Polti.) Although original 
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plots (dramatic situations) were exhausted centuries ago, 
original and novel ideas for handling old plots seem inex-
haustible, and as long as sufficient originality in treatment or 
handling of the old plot appears the law endeavors to afford 
property protection. 
In Golding, where the details and whole treatment of plain-
tiffs' play and defendant's picture are essentially different, 
and where the only possibly cognizable similarity is in the 
so-called "central core" or "basic plot," we can turn to a 
plot catalog and it becomes immediately obvious that no prop-
erty right of plaintiffs has been appropriated in The Ghost 
Ship. But here, as above indicated, the problem and its 
solution are not so simple; the answer cannot as yet, I think, 
be found in a catalog nor even in the law books. 
The plaintiff here did not write a story or a play. He does 
not claim originality in the handling of any dramatic plot. 
He does claim to have originated a plan for a radio program, 
and to have written and recorded the formal script for the 
proposed program. Such a plan, together with its script, if 
truly original, may constitute a protectible "product of the 
mind" (see Civ. Code, § 980). Tbe plan, together with the 
script as formulated by plaintiff, has been set forth fully in 
the majority opinion and is largely again quoted in the dis-
senting opinion of Justice Traynor; it need not be repeated 
here. Suffice it to say that such plan proposed this version 
of the "theatre of the air" type of weekly program: Recog-
nized plays-at least plays which had already been produced 
or scheduled for production in motion picture form-would 
not be used; instead, sketches or scenarios which the author 
was offering for motion picture use would be adapted for radio 
presentation; the special announcer or "producer" for the 
radio presentation would be a prominent picture figure; he 
would ask the radio audience to send in their opinions of the 
show with particular reference as to whether they would like 
a motion picture version and their ideas for casting the parts; 
a cash prizc would be awarded each week to the author of 
the "best letter"; the program would be denominated " __ _ 
[the producer] Presents" and, gencrically, it was referred to 
as a "Hollywood Preview" or "Preview Parade." Plaintiff 
does not claim to have himself authored any play offered for 
use on the proposed program. 
Several years after the plaintiff's plan was submitted to 
defendant it (in 1945) produced a program entitled "Holly-
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wood Preview." Like plaintiff's plan it embodied a theatre-
of-the-air type presentation "of a motion picture of the fu· 
ture" with announcements pertaining to the production by 
an "eminent star of radio, stage and screen"; the studio 
audiences were requested to "fin out cards giving their com· 
ments" on the proposed picture production and" suggesting 
their favorite stars for the motion picture." Likewise, the 
defendant in connection with the program it produced, an-
nounced a six-weeks prize-contest for best letters relating to 
the program in which letters, it was suggested, the listeners 
should" express their opinion of the stories' previewed' " and 
"vote for the stories they would like to see on the screen." 
The perYasive over-all similarity between plaintiff's pro-
gram-pIan and that used by defendant is patent; the evidence 
establishes (under rules which historically have governed 
appellate courts) that plaintiff submitted his plan to defend· 
ant and that there was opportunity to appropriate it. The 
jury, under proper instructions, impliedly found that it was 
appropriated with an implied promise to pay its reasonable 
value. The basic question for us then, as I view it, is this: 
Is the plan as presented by plaintiff such an original product of 
the mind as to be legally the subject of private ownership T 
If it is, and if a protectible element of it has been appropriated 
by defendant, the verdict must stand; if not, the defendant 
is entitled to judgment. 
A fair answer to such critical question requires this further 
factual analysis. No single basic element of plaintiff's pro-
gram can be said to be novel or to have originated with him; 
all such elements had been used before. Plaintiff, however, 
did suggest what appears to have been a novel adaptation and 
application of the audience participation idea-its adaptation 
and application, theoretically, to aid producers in the selection 
of stories for picture production. The real object of the au-
dience participation technique is, of course, an appeal to the 
interest of the listeners. This program, it would seem, was 
devised to appeal particularly to "movie fans," to win their 
radio program attention through catering to their motion 
picture interest. Upon the record it cannot be held that this 
particular application of the audience participation appeal, 
as it was dressed up and treated by plaintiff, was not origi-
nated by him nor that its admittedly somewhat varied and 
limited use in the program produred by defendant was so 
unsubstantial as to be legally negligible. 
The learned and careful trial judge painstakingly explained 
Aug. 1950) STANLEY V. COLUMBIA BROADCASTING SYSTE)( 671 
(35 C.2cl 653: 221 P.2d '73] 
to the jury that •• Any person is free to use matters in the 
public domain as sources of literary or dramatic property 
but no person . . . is free to use the composition of another 
if such composition involves a new arrangement, combination 
or treatment of matters in the public domain, although such 
matters by themselves might not be protectible." He further 
told the jury that "in order to return a verdict for plaintiff, 
the radio program idea which plaintiff expressed in writing 
and recorded, or some feature thereof, must have been new, 
novel and original. An abstract idea cannot be the subject 
matter of an implied agreement to purchase but if such ab-
stract idea is reduced to concrete form, it may in such form be 
made the subject of such an agreement to the extent that 
the concrete form of such idea is new, novel and original." 
Lastly, in this connection, it is to be noted that the jury were 
told; "You should determine, first [italics added], whether 
plaintiff's idea could be the subject matter of such an agree-
ment; secondly, whether the facts justify your finding that 
there was any such implied agreement; and, thirdly, whether 
defendant copied or appropriated from plaintiff any portion 
of plaintiff's idea which is found to be a proper subject matter 
of such an agreement"; and he cautioned tbe jury, "If you 
find similarities between plaintiff's program . . . and defend-
ant's program ... you must determine, first, wbether any 
of such similarities are in ideas or features or combinations 
thereof which are new, novel or original, and, secondly, 
whether, if any such similarities exist such similarities were 
appropriated by defendant from plaintiff's program or, on 
the other hand, whether they were originated by employees of 
defendant or were secured from sources other than plaintiff's 
program. Unless you are convinced . . . that there are such 
similarities between the two programs and that such similari-
ties are a result of defendant's use of plaintiff's program rather 
than origination and development by employees of defendant 
or from the use of other sources, your verdict must be for the 
defendant . . . Independent creation of identical ideas is not 
a basis for liability. In order that a verdict can be returned 
against defendant there must have been copying or appro-
priation from plaintiff." 
It is difficult to conceive how the jury could have been more 
clearly or adequately instructed on the applicable law. The 
question as to whether, on the law as declared by the trial 
judg-p. tIl{' f'yidenp(' admits of thr tinnings made by the jury 
is admittedly a close one. But where, as .bere, there is an 
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el(!ment of originality in plaintiff's program and there is some 
similarity between every element of plaintiff's program and 
that which defendant produced, and where plaintiff's pro-
gram was submitted to defendant and the jury has found, 
on the instructions quoted, that defendant copied and ap-
propriated plaintiff's program, including an original element 
thereof, in the construction of the one it produced, and further 
found the implied promise to pay the value of that which it 
appropriated, it seems to me that we should breach a fun-
damental principle of trial by jury were we to hold that the 
evidence does not support the verdict. In other words, I 
think that the dissenting view in this case rests not on a pure 
question of law nor on a total lack of evidence but, necessarily, 
on an analysis of the evidence which argues its weight. I do 
not think that because the element of originality in the com-
bination of free ideas is comparatively small, we can hold that 
as a matter of law the composition is wholly unprotectible. 
Obedient, then, to the principle declared in such cases as 
Oardillo v. Liberty Mutual Ins. 00. (1947), 330 U.S. 469 [67 
8.Ct. 801, 807, 91 L.Ed. ]028) ; Ellis v. Union Pacific Railroad 
00. (1947), 329 U.S. 649, 653 [67 8. Ct. 598, 600, 91 L.Ed. 
572, 576]; Eagles v. United States ex ,.el. Samuels (1946), 
329 U.S. 304, 317 [67 8.Ct. 313, 320, 91 L.Ed. 308, 317]; 
Estate of Bristol (1943),23 Ca1.2d 221, 223 [143 P.2d 689]; 
Oate v. Oe,.tain-teed P,.od. 00. (1943), 23 Cal.2d 444, 448 
[144 P.2d 335) ; Estate of Teel (1944), 25 Cal.2d 520, 526 
[154 P.2d 384); Fackrell v. Oity of San Diego (1945), 26 
Cal.2d 196, 207 [157 P.2d 625, 158 A.L.R. 625]; Viner v. 
Untrecht (1945), 26 Ca1.2d 261, 267 [158 P.2d 3]; Pewitt 
v. Riley (1945),27 Ca1.2d 310, 316 [163 P.2d 873] ; De Young 
v. De Young (1946), 27 Ca1.2d 521, 526 [165 P.2d 457]; 
Millsap v. National Funding Oorp. (1944), 66 Cal.App.2d 
658, 665 [152 P.2d 634] ; S01tthern Oalif. F,.eight Lines v. 
State Bd. of Equalization (1945),72 Cal.App.2d 26, 29 [163 
P.2d 776] ; Berry v. Ohaplin (1946), 74 Cal.App.2d 652, 663 
[169 P.2d 442] ; Medina v. Van Camp Sea Food 00. (1946), 
75 Cal.App.2d 551, 556 [171 P.2d 445) ; Seidenberg v. George 
(1946), 76 Cal.App.2d 306, 308 [172 P.2d 891], the verdict 
should be sustained. 
For the reasons above stated I concur in the judgment of 
affirmance. 
TRAYNOR, J, Dissenting.-Abstract ideas are common 
property freely available to all. What men forge out of th., ! 
) 
Aug. 1950) STANLEY v. COW'MB1A BROADCASTING SYSTEM 673 
[35 C.2d 653; 221 P.2d 13J 
ideas with skill, industry, and imaginntion, into concrete forms 
uniquely their own, the law protects as private property. It 
gives the special form the stamp of recognition; it does so to 
stimulate creative activity. It does something more to stimu-
late creative activity: it assures all men free utilization of 
abstract ideas in the process of crystallizing them in fresh 
forms. For creativeness thrives on freedom; men find new 
implications in old ideas when they range with open minds 
through open fields. They would indeed be stifled in their 
efforts to create forms worth protecting, if in the common 
through which they ranged they were diverted from their 
course by one enclosure after another. "We must take care 
to guard against two extremes equally prejudicial: The one 
that men of ability, who have employed their time for the 
service of the community, may not be deprived of their just 
merits and the reward of their ingenuit~, aDd labor; the other, 
that the world may not be deprived of improvements, nor the 
progress of the arts be retarded. The act that secures copy-
rights to authors guards against the piracy of the words and 
sentiments, but does not prohibit writing on the same subjeet. " 
(Lord Mansfield, in Sayre v. Moore, 1 East 361, 101 Eng.Rep. 
140.) 
It would be ironic if copyright law, designed to encourage 
creative activity, became the instrument of its destruction. 
The very function of creative activity is to keep the common 
field in continuous germination; it is not for copyright law to 
render it barren by a succession of enclosures denying access 
to those who would cultivate it. "The object of copyright is to 
promote science and the useful arts. If an author, by originat-
ing a new arrangement and form of expression of certain 
ideas or conceptions, could withdraw these ideas or conceptions 
from the stock of materials to be used by other authors, each 
copyright would narrow the field of thought open for develop-
ment and exploitation, and science, poetry, narrative, and 
dramatic fiction and other branches of literature would be 
hindered by copyright, instead of being promoted. A poem 
consists of words, expressing conceptions of words or lines of 
thoughts; but copyright in the poem gives no monopoly in the 
separate words, or in the ideas, conception, or facts expressed 
or described by the words. A copyright extends only to the 
arrangement of the words. A copyright does not give a monop-
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exploit the facts, experiences, field of thought, and general i 
ideas, provided they do not substantially copy a concrete form, 
in which the circumstances and ideas have been developed, 
arranged and put into shape." (Eichel v. Marcin, 241 F. 404, 
408-409; Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121; 
Balmes v. Burst, 174 U.S. 82 [19 8.0t. 606, 43 L.Ed. 904].) 
To insure free trade in ideas, therefore, the monopoly created 
by copyright is limited to "the arrangement and combination 
of the ideas . . . the form, sequence and manner in which 
the combination expresses the ideas." (Bowen v. Yankee 
Network, Inc., 46 F.Supp. 62, 64.) 
The policy that precludes protection of an abstract idea 
by copyright does not prevent its protection by contract. 
Even though an idea is not property subject to exclusive 
ownership, its disclosure may be of substantial benefit to the 
person to whom it is disclosed. That disclosure may there-
fore be consideration for a promise to pay. (Bristol v. 
Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 132 N.Y. 264,267 [30 N.E. 506, 28 
Am.St.Rep. 568] ; Moore v. Ford Motor Co., 43 F.2d 685, 686.) 
Unlike a copyright, a contract creates no monopoly; it is 
effective only between the contracting parties; it does not 
withdraw the idea from general circulation. Any person not 
a party to the contract is free to use the idea without 
restriction. 
Even though the idea disclosed may be "widely known and 
generally understood" (Schonwald v. F. Burkart Mfg. Co., 356 
Mo. 435 [202 S.W. 2d 7, 13], it may be protected by an express 
contract providing that it will be paid for regardless of its 
lack of novelty. (Brunner v. Stix, Baer & Fuller Co., 352 Mo. 
1225, 1237 [181 S.W.2d 643] ; High v. Trade Union CouNr 
Pub. Corp., 69 N.Y.S. 2d 526, 529.) An implied-in-fact con-
tract differs from an express contract only in that the promise 
is not expressed in language but implied from the promisor's 
conduct. (Yadkoe v. Fields, 66 Cal.App.2d 150,158 [151 P.2d I 
906] ; Ryan & Associates, Inc. v. Century Brewing Assn., 185 . 
Wash. 600, 603 [55 P.2d 1053, 104 A.L.R. 1353]; Cole v. 
Phillips H. Lord, Inc., 262 App.Div. 116 [28 N.Y.S.2d 404, 
409].) It is not a reasonable assumption, however, in the 
absence of an express promise, or unequivocal conduct from 
which one can be implied, that one would obligate himself to 
pay for an idea that he would otherwise be free to use. E~en 
an express contract to pay for "valuable informlltion" to be 
submitted by the plaintiff does not carry the im~lication of a 
'Promise to pay if it is found upon disclosure to be common 
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knowledge. (Masline v. New York, New Haven & Hartford 
R. Co., 95 Conn. 702. 708 [112 A. 639].) If the idea is not 
noyel, the evidence must establish that the promisor agreed 
expressly or impliedly to pay for the idea whether or not it 
was novel. (Masline v. New York, New Ilaven ~ Hartford 
R. Co., supra ; Soule v. Bon Ami Co., 235 N.Y. 609 [139 N.E. 
754].) 
The gravamen ot plaintiff's cause of action is not the un-
authorized use of his idea, since ideas may be freely borrowed, 
but the breach of an agreement to pay for its use. If the 
evidence discloses that there is no express or implied-in-fact 
contract there can be no recovery. (Bristol v. Equitable Life 
Assur. Soc., 132 N.Y. 264, 267 [30 N.E. 506. 28 Am.St.Rep. 
568) ; Alberts v. Remington Rand, Inc., 175 Misc. 486 [23 
N.Y.S.2d 892, 894]; Bowen v. Yankee Network, Inc., 46 F. 
Supp. 62, 63-64.) It is urged that even in the absence of 
express or implied contract, recovery may be predicated upon 
a quasi contract, or implied-in-law promise to pay the reason-
able value of the idea if it is used. Quasi-contractual liability, 
however, is based, not upon an;\' evidence of consensual agree-
ment but in the absence of such agreement, upon the theory 
that the defendant would be unjustly enriched if he were 
allowed to use the idea without paying for it. A defendant 
who makes use of an abstract idea that is common property is 
not unjustly enriched thereby, since he has taken nothing to 
which the plaintiff or any other person has the right of 
exclusive ownership. Gh'en the principle that abstract ideas 
are free, there is no more right to recovery for their use in 
an action in quasi contract than in an action for infringement 
of copyright. It has been consistently beld that an action in 
quasi contract for the nse of an idea is governed by the same 
principles that control a tort action for copyright infringe-
ment: the idea must be embodied in a concrete form attri-
butable to plaintiff's own ingenuity (Baile1l v. Haberle Con-
gress Brewing Co .• 193 Misc. 723 185 N.Y.S.2d 51, 52) ; Bowen 
v. Yankee Network,lnc., 46 F.Supp. 62.63; Thomas v. R.J. 
Reynold.~ Tobacco Co., 350 Pa. 262. 267 f38 A.2d 61. 157 
A.L.R. 14321; Moore v. Ford Motor Co., 28 F.2d 529, 539, 
aff'd. 43 F.2d 685.688), and the form af; dif;tin~uished from 
th" abstrart idra mnst be used br thE' dt'fendant. (Matarese 
v. Moore-1I1cCormack T.ines. Inc .. 158 F.2d 631. 634; Plus 
Promotions, Inc., ". R.C.A. Mfg. Co .• 49 F.Supp. 116, 117; 
Booth v. Stutz Motor Car Co., 56 F.2d 962, 969.) In either 
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case the plaintiff must prove that property was taken that was 
his. His choice of alternative actions is analogous to that of 
a plaintiff whose personal property has been converted and 
who may elect between a tort action for the value of the 
converted property and an action based upon an implied-in. 
law contract to pay the reasonable value of its use. The 
plaintiff's election will govern the nature of his recovery, but 
it does not affect the basic elements of his caus!: of action. 
(Bank of America v. Hill, 9 Ca1.2d 495, 498-499 [71 P.2d 258] ; 
Los Angeles Drug Co., v. Superior Court, 8 Ca1.2d 71, 74 [63 
P.2d 1124] ; Hallidie v. Enginger, 175 Cal. 505,508 [166 P.1]; 
Corey v. Struve, 170 Cal. 170, 172 [149 P. 48] ; Bechtel v. 
Chase, 156 Cal. 707, 711 [106 P. 81].) 
Plaintiff developed a script and format embodying his idea 
for a radio program based upon the production of radio plays 
in a Hollywood setting. Had defendant appropriated the 
concrete form in which the idea was expressed, the' 'literary or 
artistic creation available for advertising use or otherwise" 
(WtLliamson v. New York Cent. R. Co., 258 App. Div. 226 [16 
N.Y.S.2d 217]), plaintiff would have a cause of action for 
infringement of his common law copyright in the development 
of the idea that he had conceived. (Civ. Code, § 980; Barsha v. 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures Corp., 32 Cal.App.2d 556, 561 
[90 P.2d 371] ; Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 
F.2d 49, 54.) Plaintiff concedes, however, that there could be 
no recovery if this action were one in tort for copyright 
infringement and that he was properly nonsuited as to his 
cause of action based thereon, presumably because there was 
no appropriation of whatever craftsmanship gave concrete 
form to his program idea. For the same reason there could be 
no recovery in quasi contract. Plaintiff can only recover upon 
an implied-in-fact agreement that defendant would pay him 
the reasonable value of his idea. 
Plaintiff's second cause of action, upon which the judgment 
in his favor rests, was based upon the allegation that he 
submitted his program idea to defendant's agents "at said 
defendant's special instance and request . . . under and 
pursuant to an implied agreement that if said defendant used 
plaintiff's said radio program or any part or portion ~hereof, 
that said defendant would pay to plaintiff the reasonable value 
thereof." There is substantial evidence to support the allega-
tion that defendant accepted plaintiff's submission of his pro-
gram idea with knowledge that he expected to be compen-
sated for its use under an implied agreement that he would be 
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paid for the idea if it proved to be commercially valuable 
and was in fact used by the defendant.l The evidence does 
not, however, furnish support for an inference that defendant 
agreed to pay for the use of the idea even though it might 
prove to be •• common or even open to public knowledge. " (High 
v. Trade Union Oourier Pub. Oorp., 69 N.Y.S.2d 526, 529.) 
Such a promise cannot reason a bly be implied from the 
practice of the radio industry.2 Admittedly, the industry is 
'Plaintiff testHled to bis conl'ersation with RullS Jobnson, then pro· 
gram director of KNX, defendant's station for tbe Los Angeles area: 
., 1 think 1 caned bim on the telephone for an appointment and told 
him 1 had a recording. and a format and a script on what I thought 
was a new and a good radio idl'a. and be asked nie to bring it to bis 
office. 1 brought it to his offiee. and when I got it there he told me he 
was very busy at the time and would 1 please leal'e the recording. and 
the script and the format with him for about a week or 10 days. or 
at the outside two weeks. and that he would listen to me m the mterim 
and give me his opinion as to what he thought of it, and if the Colum-
bia Broadcasting System or it~ ~lIles department could sell it." 
Hal Hudson, defendant's westel'D program director, also testified 
to his conversation with Ben Paley. defendant's progranl operationl 
manager: 
"Q. Did Mr. Paley ever Dlention to you the fact that Stanley had a 
program' 
.. A. Yes. At some iater date I believe be told me that Mr. Stanley 
had a program entitled Walter Wanger Presents. 
"Q. Well, can you fix the date of t11at statement that Mr. Paley made 
to you' 
"A. Only that it undoubtedly was after May 16, 1943 beeauae before 
that time I had no responsibilities toward new programs. My duties were 
concerned with programs ou the air. 
"Q. Wh .. ; did Mr. Paley tell you about this program Walter Wanger 
Presents' 
, • A. He told me ouly that Stanley, wbom 1 had previoualy met, had 
such a program . 
•• Q. Did be tell you what it was about? 
.. A. No, he didn't. 
.. Q. What was the occasion of his mentioning it to you? What did 
he say' 
"A. I think he said m effect, • Stanley bas a program Walter Wanl!;er 
Presents which 1 would like to have you hear.' 
•• Q. Did be ten you it concel'Ded the broadcast of stories written for 
motion pictures' 
"A. No. He told me nothing about it. He said. 'I thmk it is a pretty 
good program.' ,. 
-rbe testimony of Hudson, uJlon which plaintiff relies, demonstrates 
the willingness of the industry to pay for ideas of commercial value but 
furnishes no support for any inference tbat it would agree to pay for 
common and backneyed ideas: . 
.. Q. Now, Mr. HUdson. is tllI.')·P any reeognized right in the radio 
field t.o an original pro!!,ram idclI' 
.. A. It seems to me that i~ A point of law whieh 1 am not qualified 
to answer . 
• « Q. You are not familiar with the practices of the blduatry 10 far 
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willing to pay for new ideas of commercial value to it, but 
there is no basis for an inference that a national radio network 
would agr('(' to pay for the U!i(' of an idea, regardless of whether 
it is novel or t;hopwol'll, hacluwyeu, and commonplace. .. A 
duty not to use an idea alr(·ady known cannot be created 
by virtue of the fact that one lIIa);:es a confidential disclosure of 
that idea." (Smoley v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 24 l<'.Supp. 294, 
300, aff'd. 106 F.2d 314.) Plaintiff's recognition that novelty 
is essential to the marketability of a radio program· idea is 
implicit in his statement to Johnson that he had "what I 
thought was a new and a good radio idea." Defendant's 
policy is set forth in a standard form, of which plaintiff was 
aware, that all persons who submit program ideas for con-
sideration were requested to sign.a In that form, Columbia 
unequivocally disclaimed any intention to pay for the use of 
a non-novel idea. Its willingness to consider plaintiff's pro-
gram idea was in accord with that policy. The evidence does 
not indicate any intention on defendant's part to deviate 
therefrom. It must therefore be held that plaintiff submitted 
bis program idea to defendant upon the latter's implied-in-fact 
promise to pay him the reasonable value of the idea if it should 
prove to be novel and commercially valuable and if defendant 
should put it to use. 
&8 the recognition of program ideas are concerned, or payment therefor? 
• • A. I am familiar with the practice, yes. . 
"Q. Now, ia there BUch a thing aa recognition iD the radio iDd1l8tl'7 
of a radio program idea' 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. By MlL FENDLER: Is there any practice iD the zadio iDdustl'7 
on the part of broadeaating companies to pay for the reasonable value 
of radio program ideas apart from services' 
"A. Ideas which they have contracted for' 
•• Q. Which they have contracted for or used. 
"A. Which they have contracted for, yes. 
"Q. As a matter of fact, the broadcasting companies request the lub· 
miasion of program ideaa, do they not' 
"A. I wouldn't say they solicit them. They accept them. 
•• Q. And they accept them upon the buia that if they are 1II8d,. they 
wID be paid for? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. Is that right! 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And that is well tmderstood iD the iDd1l8tr7. _" "that eorreeU 
"A. Yes." 
... To Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. 
"I am submitting my idea, summarized or eharacterizedbe1ow, about 
a radio program to you today with the understanding that you are wholly 
free to determine questions of priority and originality ia eoaneetion 
wWl ally icleRti.eal 01' nb8tantially aimilar Mleaa • • ." 
) 
) 
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This appeal thus presents two questions for the decision of 
this court: 
(1) Is plaintiff's radio program or any part thereof novel 
and commercially valuable T 
(2) Is there similarity between plaintiff's idea and defend-
ant's radio program with respect to any novel aspects of 
the former to support an inference that defendant made UD-
authorized use of plaintiff's idea' 
1 
Plaintiff testified that the basic idea of his program, for the 
use of which he claimed a reimbursement of $100,000, was to 
give the people of America "a voice in what pictures Holly-
wood shall produce in the years to come." His idea took the 
form of a proposed weekly radio program entitled "Walter 
Wanger Presents," "Preview Parade," or "Hollywood Pre-
view," which was to present a play that might be suitable for 
motion picture production. The listening public was to be 
encouraged to write letters, by an offer of prizes for the best, 
commenting upon the motion picture value of the plays and 
suggesting stars for the leading roles; it was thus to have a 
voice in selecting stories and stars for motion pictures. 
Virtually none of the elements of the proposed program to 
give the public a voice in this selection is novel. There is nothing 
novel in the idt'a of linking dramatized stories on the radio 
with the glamour of Hollywood. The following programs, 
broadcast nationally, were also based upon this idea: "Lux 
Theater of the Air," "Hollywood Star Time," "Screen Guild 
Theater," "Hollywood Premiere." "Hollywood Playtime," 
"Hollywood Players," "This is Hollywood." 
There is nothing novel about plaintiff's title "Hollywood 
Preview." There was uncontradicted testimony that during 
the period defendant's program was broadcast, another pro-
gram with the same title was broadcast locally over other 
stations. Moreover, these words have long been associated with 
the previews of Hollywood motion pictures. notably at 
Grauman's Chinese Theater and at the Carthay Circle Theater. 
To the millions of movie-conscious persons at whom all these 
programs are aimed. the title has becomt' generic and de-
scriptive, symbolizing the glamour associated with Hollywood. 
the bright lights, the mi11ing throngs waiting for a glimpse 
of tht' celt'brities attending a tirst showing of a motion picture .. 
"Thert' can be no property in words which are merely generic 
or descriptive." (Johnston v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film 
) 
/ 
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Corp.,82 Cal.App.2d 796, 808 [187 P.2d 474].) That this title 
is generic or descriptive is clearly indicated by plaintiff's use 
of it in the script of his proposed program, not as its title (the 
proposed title was "Walter Wanger Presents"), but as a de-
scriptive term, indicating the first performance of a proposed 
motion picture. In giving their program this title, defendants 
appropriated nothing in which plaintiff could claim a property 
interest. 
There is nothing novel in the idea of listener participation in 
a radio program. Radio has long been glutted with programs 
in which listeners are importuned to participate. Thus 
listeners on the Jack Benny program were importuned to sub-
mit letters on the topic "I hate J a ('I, Benny because-. " 
Listeners on the progran. entitled "The Shadow" were im-
portuned to relate in a hundred words or less why they use 
Camay Soap. Listeners on the program entitled" Listeners' 
Digest" were importuned to write on what they considered the 
outstanding radio entertainment they had heard in the pre-
ceding week. 
There is nothing novel in the idea of giving prizes to radio 
listeners for best letters. The idea of giving prizes for best 
letters is an ancient one in advertisin~. 
There is nothing novel in the idea of soliciting the comments 
of listeners as to whether a radio program merits commercial 
presentation. Thus the Major Bowes program solicited the 
comment of listeners on the amateurs on the program with the 
object of determining whether they should receive profes-
sional engagements. 
There is nothing novel about the following elements or 
their combination with the foregoinl-! features of plaintiff's 
program: repetition and emphasis of the title throughout the 
broadcast. introduction of the master of ceremonies. by the 
announcer, a master of ceremonies prominent in the motion 
picture industry, announcement of the title of the play to be 
presented and tIle stars therein, and announcement of the 
author of the pla;v. These dements have for years been a 
part of almost every program fell turing radio stories with a 
Hollywood connection. Defendant, as well as plaintiff, may 
nse these elements freel~' either singly or in combination. (See, 
Orn.~fein ~. Paramollnt Productions, l'I1c .. 9 F.Supp. 896, 901.) 
It may br possible' to combinr sllch hacknryro elements so 
imagilllltiwly that the~' comprif;r a novel program idea, or 
to gi"e them a new twist that places them in tIl(> catefron' of 
fresh material. A new twist to a worn idea may be as much 
) 
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entitled to credit as an entirely new idea. "No man writes 
exclusively from his own thoughts, unaided and uninstructed 
by the thoughts of others. The thoughts of every man are, 
more or less, a combination of what other men have thought 
and expressed .... " (Emerson v. Davies, Fed.Cas. 4, 436, 
8 Fed.Cas. 615, 618.) "Presenting old material in a new plan 
or arrangement is sufficient to lend copyrightability to the re-
sulting work." (Amdur, Copyright Law and Practice, 86; 
Universal Pictures Co. v. HaroZfJ. Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354, 
363; Edwards ct Deutsch Lithographing Co. v. Boorman, 15 
F .2d 35, 36.) Two architects may originate very different 
designs for the same structure, specifying the use of identical 
materials; each has a property interest in his design. Simi-
larly writers may create original stories out of the same prob-
lem, as Anatole France created "Thais," Somerset Maugham, 
"Miss Thompson" ("Rain"), and Andre Gide, "Symphonie 
Pastorale. " And in the literature of music there are many 
creative variations by one great composer on the themes of 
another. 
Plaintiff has made no unique combination or interpretation 
of old material. Whatever novelty there may be in his pro-
gram lies in a fresh variation of the listener participation idea, 
a variation of the idea in the Major Bowes program of having 
the listeners participate in determining whether amateur 
artists should become professionals. Although the evidence 
demonstrates that previous to the presentation of plaintiff's 
program to defendant there was no radio program in which 
the listeners participated in determining the selection of 
stories and stars for motion pictures, there is a question 
whetherplaintift' has conceived a variation of the listener 
participation idea substantial enough to warrant a claim to 
novelty, Novelty of ideas in radio programs must be assessed 
in the light of the fact that many programs are commonplace 
presentations of commonplace materials. Inevitably ideas in 
this field may have a claim to novelty by virtue of their 
attention-getting possibilities, even though they lack the bril-
liance commonly associated with creative thought. A fresh 
application of the familiar, however dull or commonplace it 
may appear to the critical, may be a marketable idea if it 
gives enough promise of winning the attention of the public. 
It is not for the court to consider the quality of an idea or tl> 
pass judgment on the public's taste; the problem before it is 
not one of aesthetics but of property rights. (B1.eUtein v. 
) 
) 
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Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251·252 [23 S.Ct. 
298, 47 L.Ed. 460].) On the other hand, in the fertile field 
of commonplaceness there is also a propagation of ideas whos ' 
claims to novelty are spurious, for whatever value they rna. 
have rests not on their uniqueness but on their resemblance t 
the familiar. The value of a fresh application of an idea that 
has thrived on repetition may lie. not in the application, but 
in the familiar idea itself. The secret of success of such pro 
grams as plaintiff's seems to be listener participation. and; 
since listener participation has already been used for such 
a variety of purposes, it is open to question whether its appli., 
cation to plaintiff's purpose is imaginative enough to compel 
one to say that something new has been added, that there has 
been a variation of the old that in some measure transforms 
it. (See, Hirsch v. Paramount Pictures, 17 F.Supp. 816, 818.) 
II 
Whatever the validity of plaintiff's claim to novelty for his 
application of the listener participation idea, it constitutes his 
only claim to novelty, and defendant is not liable if it did not 
use that application. 
There can be no finding that defendant used plaintiff's 
program idea without proof that it had access thereto. 
(Twentieth Century.Fox Film Corp. v. Dieckhaus, 153 F.2d 
893, 894, cert.den. 329 U.S. 716 [67 S.Ct. 46, 91 L.Ed. 621J ; 
Lewys v. O'Neill, 49 F.2d 603, 608,610.) Access is established 
by proof that employees of defendant read or heard plaintiff's 
program before or in the course of the development of defend· 
ant's program. (Kustoff v. Chaplin, 120 F.2d 551, 560.) It 
is undisputed that before defendant's program was broadcast, 
the employees of defendant had read and considered the 
script, recording, and format submitted to them by plaintiff. 
There was a conftict in the evidence as to whether Hudson. 
defendant's western program director, developed defendant's 
program before plaintiff submitted his idea. The jury re·, 
solved that conflict against the defendant. Proof of oppor-' 
tunity to use plaintiff's idea, however, does not compel 
affirmance of the judgment without proof that defendant 
availed itself of that opportunity. (Kustol/ v. Chaplin. supra;' 
Cain v. Universal Pictures Corp., 47 F.Supp. 1013, 1015.) 
Direct proof of use is seldom available. If there is proof of 
access. however, copying may be inferred from similarity be· 
tween the two programs with rpspp('t to the feature of plain-
tiff's idea, which it will be a8sumed for the purpose of this 
) 
) 
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dissent was novel, the application of listener participation to 
the determination of a story's suitability for motion pictures. 
1t must therefore be determined whether there is such a 
similarity between the two programs. Mere general simi-
larity that proceeds not from the novelty of plaintiff's idea but 
from its commonplaceness is irrelevant. Only sillJilarity with 
respect to what is novel in plaintiff's idea is relevant. (Booth 
v. Stutz Motor Oar 00., 56 F.2d 962, 969; Sacu-Lowell Shops v. 
Reynolds, 141 F.2d 587, 593; Plus Promotion.~, Inc. v. R.O.A. 
Mffl. 00., 49 F.Supp. 116. 117.) The staudards that govern 
this inquiry are the same as those governing tbe question 
whether there is relevant similarity between two productions 
to support a finding of copying in a suit for copyright in-
fringement. When a plaintiff claims the protection of com-
mon law or statutoQ' copyright for his literary effort, that 
protection extends only to any originality of treatment or 
expression that is copyri~htable. When a plaintiff claims 
the protection of an implied-in-fact contract for an abstract 
idea, his idea must bave the characteristic of novelty for which 
defendant has promised to pay. In both cases, only similarity 
appearing between the two works with respect to that which 
is protected in plaintiff's work is relevant. General similarity 
in nonprotectible elements. being irrelevant, cannot support 
an inference of copying in a piracy suit or use in a suit upon 
a contract. (Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer, 65 F.2d 1, 17; 
MacDonald v. Du Maurier, 75 F.Supp. 655, 662; Shipman v. 
R.K.O. Radio Pictures Oorp., 100 F.2d 533, 537; Rosen v. 
Loew's, Inc., 162 F.2d 785, 788.) 
'rhe majority opinion bolds that the jury's finding will he 
upheld on appeal if "such similarity exists between plaintiff's 
and defendant's prugrams as to suggest to the average person 
the use by defendant of an idea originating with plaintiff .... 
In determining whet.hef the similarity which exists between 
a copyrighted literary, dramatic or musical work and an 
alleged infringing publication is due to copying, the common 
knowledge of the average reader, observer, spectator or 
listener is the standard of judgment which must be used .... 
The evidence, in the form of the two programs alone, shows 
that there is snbstantial similal'ity to support the verdict." 
This statement assumes that a general similarity between the 
two programs justifies submitting to the jury the issue of use. 
Recovery can be allowed, however, only if there is similarity 
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between the programs with respect to the novel aspects of 
plaintiff's program. 
The majority opinion holds that plaintiff has met this 
requirement by introducing evidence that his program con-
tains a novel idea. OHee he has done this, the mere fact of 
introduction of the two programs into evidence is enough to 
an ow the case to go to tll!? jury and to support a verdict 
reached thereon. TlJe jury compares the programs as an 
average listener would. If it receives the impression from its 
common knowlf'dge that there is similarity between the two 
programs, this impression and common knowledge support the 
inference that defendant used plaintiff's program idea, and 
defendant is liable for the reasonable vahle thereof. The jury 
may determine that defendant must pay therefor, even though 
it is evident that plaintiff's protectible property interest in 
his program comprises onl~' a small part thereof, and even 
thoug-h it is evident from a comparison of the two programs 
that there is no similarity between them in regard to the 
novel idea of plaintiff's program. Such a procedure may 
have the prejudicial effect of supporting a charge of piracy 
even thongh substantial similarity between two programs 
resnlts from the use in both of stock situations or standardized 
techniqnes long used in the radio industry and therefore in 
the public domain. (See. Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer, 65 
F.2d 1. ]7. Moore v. Ford Motor Co., 28 F.2d 529. 536; 
Echet~arria v Warner Bros. Pictures, 12 F.Supp. 632. 635; 
18 C.J.S. 231.) It is therE'fore of the grcatest importance to 
narrow the issue of similarity. If the jury is permitted to 
reach its verdict on the basis of a general comparison of the 
programs in their entirety. there is great risk that similarity 
between the programs in their commonplace aspects will be 
weighed to defendant's disad,"antage and that plaintiff will be 
permitted rf'imbursement for the non-noyel elements of his 
program idea, for which defendant did not ag-ree to pay. If 
a J(eneral similarity ma~' of itsf'lf support a yerdict in plain-
tiff's favor an appel1at~ ('omt wonld be powerless to afford 
relief from such a verdict. pven thOllg"h the onl~' similarit~' 
is between th(' non-noyel elements containE'o in both programs. 
Tlle error inhE'rent in the s('ope of inquiry pr('scribed by the 
majority opinion is not ObVllltpd b:v itR concession that, once 
the jury haR rt'tnrnpd a "prdict for plaintiff that may havE:' 
bf'en based on irr('leYant g"!?neral similarity. "we 100), to the 
('vidence to as;certain whetller sueh similarity existed as to the 
portion of the production which plaintiff claims to have 
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originated." We thus have the anomalous situation in which 
a case must first be submitted to the jury and a verdict re-
turned for the plaintiff before the court can determine whether 
the case should have been submitted to the jury. 
Such a result is not supported by the weight of ease 
authority. In Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer, 65 F. 2d 1, 
plaintiff sought to enjoin the exhibition of a motion picture 
by the defendant on the ground that it constituted an infringe-
ment of a magazine story previollsly published by the plain-
tiff. Admittedly there was substantial similarity in plot and 
in several isolated comedy sequences, and on this basis, the 
trial court gave judgment for the plaintiff. The Circuit 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, however, reversed the 
judgment, stating that an examination of the two scripts 
revealed no similarity in those elements of plaintiff's produc-
tion that were the product of his own ingenuity and creative 
talent. In discussing the fact that plaintiff relied upon 
admitted similarities in basic elements of each production, the 
court stated: 
"In the case at bar, if it be assumed that there are such 
similarities between the story and the playas to provoke in 
the casual observer the consciousness that there is such a 
similarity between them, and that eopying may be inferred 
therefrom, we are still confronted with the fact that mere 
similarity does not necessarily involve literary piracy or an 
infringement of a copyright. Such similarities then as exist 
would require further analysis to determine whether or not 
they are novel in the story and thus copyrightable. The copy-
right of a story only covers what is new and novel in it, 80 
that the question of infringement involves a consideration of 
what is new and novel in the story to which the author bas 
acquired a monopoly which has been misappropriated by 
another ... 'It should also be borne steadfastly in mind, that 
if a work is not entirely original, there is no copyright in the 
unoriginal part, which wi11 prevent its use, separately, or in 
combination, with matter not covered by copyright. Hence, 
of course, any inquiry as to infringement must exclude permis-
mole reproduction of such non-original matter.'" (65 F.2d 
23-24.) 
In Dymow v. Bolton, 11 F.2d 690, the Circuit Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit also reversed a trial court verdict 
for the plaintiff that had been reached upon ndmitted Rimi-
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stating that infringement could not be established by cutting ~I', 
and trimming down to basic themes and concepts, the court 
stated: "This incomplete skeleton the two plays have in com· 
mOll, but it is with real difficulty that the flesh and bloou, 
the incidental, yet essential adornment anu trimming, of the 
plays can be cut away to show similarity between a few bones. 
This difficulty is fatal to plaintiff's case . . . the copying 
which is infringement must be something . . . recognized as 
having been takell from the work of another." (11 F .2d 692. 
See also Twentieth Oentury-Fox Film Oorp. v. Dieckhaus. 
153 F.2d 893; Nichols v. Universal Pictures Oorp., 45 F.2d 
119; Frankel v. Irwin, 34 F.2d 142; Oain v. Universal Pic-
tures Oorp., 47 F. Supp. 1013.) 
It follows that the issue before this court is not, as the 
majority opinion holds, whether there is substantial similarity 
between the two programs, but whether there is evidence of 
substantial similarity between the two programs with respect 
to plaintiff's novel idea to justify submitting the case to the 
jury. That issue can be determined only by the comparison of 
the two radio scripts whose contents are not disputed. Such 
a comparison will reveal whether there is relevant similarity 
between them. Defendant's motion for a directed verdict 
raised the issue whether there was such similarity. If there 
was no evidence of such similarity, then no proper inference 
of copying could be drawn, and the trial court should not 
have let the case go to the jury on the basis of the general 
similarity between the two programs. In denying the motion 
for a directed verdict, the trial court committed reversible 
error. (Hewitt v. Ooward, 180 Misc. 1065 [41 N.Y.S.2d 498, 
500] ; Soy Food Mills, Inc. v. Pillsbury Mills, Inc., 161 F.2d 
22,25; Nichols v. Universal Pictures Oorp., 45 F.2d 119, 122; 
Wiren v. Shubert Theatre Oorp., 5 F.Supp. 358, 362; Becker 
v. Loew's, Inc., 133 F.2d 889, 894; Dorsey v. Old Surety Life 
Ins. 00., 98 F.2d 872, 874 [119 A.L.R. 1250]; Barbadillo v. 
Goldwyn, 42 F.2d 881, 885; Eastern Wine Oorp. v. Winslow-
Warren, Ltd., 137 F.2d 955, 960; Oalifornia Fruit Growers 
Exch. v. Sunkist Baking 00., 166 F.2d 971, 973; Kaeser ~ 
Blair, Inc. v. Merchants' Assn., Inc., 64 F.2d 575, 576; see 
Code Civ. Proc., § 426, subd. 3.) 
The cases relied upon by the majority indicate that only 
when there is evidence of relevant similarity to support an 
inference of copying is the question of copying submitted to 
the jury. (Universal Pictures Oorp. V. Harold Lloyd Oorp., 
162 F.2d 354, 363; Fendler V. Moroseo, 253 N.Y. 281, 287 [171 
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N.E. 56); Barsha v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures Corp., 
32 Cal.App.2d 556, 561 [90 P .2d 371].) In reversing the 
judgment, this court would not be substituting its judgment 
for that of thE' jury, as the majority opinion suggests, but 
would be determining that there was insufficient evidence to 
support the implied finding that there was similarity between 
the two programs with respect to plaintiff's novel idea. 
Plaintiff's program was based on the idea, in his own words 
"the most important idea in my show," that it would afford the 
public a "voice in what pictures Hollywood shall produce in 
the years to come." This idea is emphasized in virtually every 
paragraph of the program: "Wanger: How do you do, 
ladies and gentlemen. Welcome to our Hollywood Preview 
Parade, a radio show designed for your pleasure and to give 
you a vwce in what pictures Hollywood shall produce in the 
months to come. Hollywood is very interested in giving you 
motion pictures you want to see. Unfortunately producers 
do not and cannot always know just what you do want. This is 
the reason for this I Preview Parade.' Each week we plan to 
present a radio story we think will make a good film. We ask 
you to send us your opinion and suggest players for the lead-
ing roles. Our sponsor will give worthwhile cash prizes for 
the best letters, but more about that later. 
"Of the five stories we have so far presented this series, 
three will be made into motion pictures largly because of your 
voting . ... 
"Boardman: ... Each week Mr. Wanger selects a story 
which he feels should be made into a picture. You are asked 
to write to Mr. Wanger and give him your opinion. The 
sponsors pay $500 for the best letter written by one of our 
listeners and if enough of you vote for it our play 1IJ1,"lZ be 
produced as a motion picture. 
"Wanger: . . . 'So Gallantly Gleaming' tells a thrilling 
and romantic story .... Listen closely. Do you think it 
should be made into a motion picturet Your votes will de-
cide. 
"Boardman: . . . Now again a word as to the real idea 
behind this program. Each week Walter Wanger Presents 
brings you a story which we think would be a good motion 
picture. And here is your part in the program. We ask you 
to write to Mr. Wanger, telling him whether or not you would 
like to have this play made into a motion picture, and why. 
Also include your choice of stars to play the leading roles. The 
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best letter received each week will receive an award of $500 
from our sponsor . ... And believe me, Hollywood is waiting 
for your vote. Whether or not you win a prize, your vote 
wt1l help decide whether or not to film 'So Gallantly Gleam-
ing.' The American picture-going public has long said it 
wished a voice in the choice of stories presented on the screen. 
Here is the chance for you to have that voice and make it heard 
across the nation. . .. 
"Last week Mr. Wanger presented 'Out of the Night.' .•• 
A storm of argument was aroused. 68,000 letters have been 
received to date, and we are happy to announce that Warner 
Brothers Studio have arranged to make this startling story 
into a film in the near future. So, thanks to your letters, you 
have helped Warner Brothers to their decis1'on to film lOut of 
the Night.' ... 
"Wanger: . . . Thank you, [board of experts] . . . Do 
you, ladies and gentlemen, agree with the opinions of our 
guests T Do you agree that 'So Gallantly Gleaming' should 
become a motion picture'! And who do you think should play 
the leading roles T Won't you write and tell us. Remember 
that whether your letter is best and wins the prize or not, you 
are helping Hollywood decide on what to give you on the 
screen.. ." (Italics added.) 
It is apparent from defendant's programs that their basic 
idea was to simulate the "first showing of a new motion pic-
ture in the film capitol" and thereby to capture in its "radio 
version of [a] Hollywood Preview," the "same spirit of en-
thusiasm," to make its listeners feel they were viewing that 
glamorous event. The programs were described as a "Holly-
wood Preview of a motion picture of the future," as a pre-
view of a "new story written especially for the screen," and 
"now scheduled for production" or "now in preparation" 
at one of the motion picture studios. The public was to be 
given "a glimpse into the movies of tomorrow" but nobody 
at any time was asked to influence their selection. The studio 
audience was requested to ., f fill] out cards giving their com-
ments" on the play and "suggesting their favorite stars for 
the motion picture" for the purpose of giving a Hollywood 
atmosphere by adapting to a broadrast of motion pictures 
"previewed" on the air, the custom of hAving the motion 
picture audience fill out preview cards. There was no in-
timation that the reaction of the studio audience would in 
any way infiuenre the production of the picture. In contrast 
the radio audience comments solicited in plaintiff's program 
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were not for thl~ purpose of atmosphere; they were indispen-
sable to his idea of giving the public a voice in the selection 
of motion pictures to be filmed. On August 21, 1945, defend-
ant announced that a contest awarding prizes for best letters 
would be staged for a six-weeks perioli j that listeners would 
thus be given "a chance to express their opinion of the 
stories they would like to see on the screen." Defendant's 
contest was the time-honored advertising scheme used to in-
crease sales of the sponsor's gasoline. To participate, listeners 
had to get entry blanks from the sponsor's service stations. 
The contest, lasting only six weeks, was an incident of the 
program, not its core. Defendant's program did not, in its 
contest feature, or otherwise, give the listening public the 
impression that" if enough of [the listeners] vote for it [the] 
play would be produced as a motion picture." It was specifi-
cally announced on defendant's programs that a "motion 
picture of the future" was being presented: on three programs 
it was stated that the plays were in production. 
A comparison of defendant's program with the application 
in plaintiff's program of the listener participation idea, makes 
it clear that defendant did not in any of its programs copy 
that idea. There is a fundamental difference between the 
themes of the two programs. The basic idea of plaintiff's 
program was listener participation in the selection of stories 
and stars for motion picture production in the future. The 
ba..,ic idea of defendant's programs was listener participation 
in the simulation of whatever glamour attends a Hollywood 
preview. If there is kinship between the two programs, it 
rests on their common capitalization of Hollywood glamour_ 
But defendant stops short of executing plaintiff's idea that 
the public might do more than behold the glamour that spells 
Hollywood by participating in determining by what and by 
whom it should be bedazzled. 
Spence, J 0, concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied August 31, 
1950. Traynor, J., and Spence, J., voted for a rehearing. 
